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Abstract
Distributed systems are typically designed for scale and
performance first, which often makes it difficult to add
security later without affecting the original properties.
This paper proposes the design of the Folklore persis-
tent distributed file system, which adopts an alternative
design methodology. Folklore’s design relies on a sin-
gle core protocol for providing both probabilistic scal-
ability and untraceability, the latter being a special no-
tion of probabilistic security. The core protocol is a bio-
logically inspired model of endemic replication that mi-
grates replicas of files among all hosts in a continuous
and proactive manner. The emergent behavior is chaotic,
meaning that the exact number and location of all repli-
cas of any file is changing all the time. This makes it dif-
ficult for an attacker to target any file. Yet, the protocol
is scalable – it consumes constant per-host bandwidth,
and the number of replicas per file stays close to a small
self-stabilizing value. The simplicity of the core protocol
allows augmentation with mechanisms that allow data
integrity, availability, and updatability. These mecha-
nisms ensure that Folklore is also resilient to massive-
scale attacks. We describe the internals of the Folklore
system, present attack analysis, and give experimental
results from a prototype that shows high resilience to se-
vere attacks.
1 Introduction
Several networked information stores such as digital
libraries [9], global-scale storage [8], “brick”-based
storage [11], etc., have emerged over the past few
years. All require an ability to scale with thousands
of hosts, as well as to provide such notions of secu-
rity as resistance to attackers, failures, and churn.
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However, many existing mechanisms that ensure
security tend to be unscalable. For instance, Byzan-
tine agreement protocols, e.g., [4] require several
rounds of all-to-all communication, preventing scal-
ability with even hundreds of hosts. Since the preva-
lent methodology to designing distributed systems
addresses scale and performance first, this makes it
difficult to add security later without affecting the
original scalability.
We are exploring the design of a persistent and
distributed file system called Folklore that provides
both scalability and certain notions of security. This
is achieved by relying on a single core protocol
that is probabilistic in nature. This core, called the
endemic replication protocol [7], continuously mi-
grates replicas of files among all the hosts in the sys-
tem. The protocol is inspired by phenomena result-
ing in survival of diseases, e.g., influenza.
The basic notion of security provided by Folk-
lore is called untraceability. The continuous mi-
gration of replicas due to the endemic replication
occurs chaotically, i.e., the exact number and loca-
tion of the replicas of a given file is changing all the
time, and in an unpredictable manner. This makes
it very difficult for any attacker to discover and de-
stroy all replicas of a targeted file. In fact, the av-
erage attack window times are very short (typically
tens of seconds), beyond which the endemic proto-
col automatically creates additional replicas that the
attacker will not know about.
Folklore is scalable because in spite of the chaotic
nature of the replication, the number of replicas of
each file stays centered around a stable value, re-
sulting in a small storage utilization. The bandwidth
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utilization at each Folklore host is surprisingly low
– it is independent of the number of hosts in the sys-
tem, and depends only on the average file size. For
an average file size of 128KB, our experiments in-
dicate that the per-host bandwidth is 3.38 KBps.
The design of Folklore augments the core proto-
col with simple mechanisms that provide (1) data
availability and updatability, i.e., the owner of a
file can quickly access and modify the file, (2) data
integrity, i.e., a file cannot be corrupted by an at-
tacker. These sub-protocols do not affect the scale
or security notions of the system.
LOCKSS [9] is the only other system that pro-
vides probabilistic security and scale. Several per-
sistent distributed stores have been built using dis-
tributed hash tables (e.g., [8, 10]), but these do not
provide untraceability. In those systems, a surrep-
titious attacker can first find out the IP addresses
of the replica nodes for a given file (through nor-
mal lookups), and then bring down these computer
hosts (either manually or through a network-based
attack), thus removing the file from the system. This
attack also works when erasure-coding based repli-
cation strategies [3] are used.
2 Design of Folklore
2.1 Core Protocol: Endemic Replication
We describe the variant of the endemic replication
protocol [7] that is used in the Folklore system.
Consider a host (henceforth a “node”) H that is cur-
rently storing replicas of some of the files inserted
into the system (perhaps by other hosts). We say
that the node is stashing each of these files, or that
it is in a stash state w.r.t. each of these files. For
all the files in the system that are not locally stashed
at H , H is either receptive or averse. H is said
to be receptive to a file f when it is willing to ac-
cept a transfer of f ’s replica from another stasher
node of f . If it refuses any such transfer, it is said
to be averse w.r.t. that file. H maintains a list of
names for files that it is averse to, while names of
the remaining files (for which it is receptive) are not
remembered.
The actions of the endemic replication protocol
are determined by four important protocol parame-
ters - protocol period T , fixed probabilities α, γ ∈
[0, 1], and an even integer β. The basic endemic pro-
tocol is periodic, with each node executing certain
actions once every T time units. Protocol periods
are asynchronous across nodes, and do not require
synchronized clocks. Parameter values are fixed at
all nodes; Section 4 discusses the effect of attacks
that modify these values.
At the start of each protocol period at node H ,
several actions are executed: (1) First, each lo-
cally stashed file is moved into the averse state with
probability γ. In the averse state, the file can be
deleted, although its filename needs to be remem-
bered in order to refuse any transfers. (2) Then, each
averse filename is forgotten (i.e., moved into recep-
tive state) with probability α. (3) Finally, H cre-
ates a constant sized stash advertisement
message, containing names of some locally stashed
files. The stash advertisement is sent to a constant
number β2 of target numbers, each target selected
uniformly at random from across the group 1. Tar-
get nodes receptive to the advertised filenames may
request a transfer from H . In turn, H requests
these target nodes to advertise their stashed files,
and transfers to itself some files that it is receptive
to. This Stash-Receptive Contact mechanism is de-
tailed in Section 2.3.
The analysis of [7] showed that for any
given file, the fractions of nodes that are
(receptive, stasher, averse) stabilize around a
single equilibrium point – (γβ ,
1− γ
β
1+ γ
α
,
1− γ
β
1+α
γ
). This
equilibrium point is stable, which means the en-
demic protocol always self-stabilizes around it.
However, the protocol exhibits chaotic perturbation
in the vicinity of this point because of random and
unpredictable choices by each node while applying
the probabilistic protocol actions (1-3) above.
2.2 Basic File Operations
A file inserted into the Folklore file system is
assigned a globally unique id using the base64-
encoded SHA1 [2] hash of the owning node’s IP
address and the filepath at the owning node.
File replicas are encrypted for privacy and plau-
sible deniability to stashers. We use symmetric
encryption that is calculated per 4 KB file-blocks.
This partial encryption will help in propagating par-
1We use a variant of the SWIM membership protocol [5] at
each node to maintain partial, local, membership lists.
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Figure 1: Message interchange when a node contacts a peer
with its stash advertisement.
tial file updates (Section 2.4). We use the efficient
Blowfish [1] encryption algorithm in Cypher Feed-
back (CB) mode, where each cleartext 4KB block
will result in a 4KB cipher.
File replicas are provided with a signature, com-
puted as privateKey.sign(SHA1(file, version, id)). A
node will refuse to store a file replica whose signa-
ture cannot be validated. The signature is verified
with an authentication token, a third party signature
of the file owner’s public key concatenated with its
IP address. The public key of the third party is pre-
installed on all nodes. Such a third party is unavoid-
able due to the Sybil attack impossibility result [6].
Finally, for a newly inserted file, the owning node
warms up the system by forcing a small random set
of nodes to become stashers for the new file; other
nodes are of course receptive.
2.3 Stash-Receptive Contacts
As explained before, each node i periodically sends
out a stash advertisement message to target node(s)
j, chosen uniformly at random. The message inter-
change is depicted in Figure 1, and detailed below.
Each filename in all advertisement messages is
specified as 〈id, version〉, the latter field being the
owner-set version, incremented whenever the owner
makes an update. Suppose node i sends a stash ad-
vertisement message, and the recipient node is j. j
replies to i with a stash-receptive message,
which contains two sets of filenames: a stash set
and a receptive set.
The stash set contains names of all files stashed
at node j that were not specified in the stash adver-
tisement message (and could thus be transferred to
i). The receptive set consists of only those filenames
chosen from the stash advertisement message from
i that either (1) j is receptive to, or (2) that are also
stashed at j but have a lower version number.
To save bandwidth, we allow a node to retain a
file replica even when it becomes averse or receptive
to the file. Accordingly, condition (1) for selecting
the receptive set changes to include those files that:
(1)* j is receptive to, and if it is retaining a copy
of, that has a lower version number than advertised
by i. In addition, any locally retained files at j, that
are advertised with a lower version number in i’s
stash advertisement, can be moved into a stash state
at node j.
Push-Pull mechanism: On receiving the stash
receptive reply M ′ from node j, node i selects
one id from M ′’s receptive set that is still stashed
at i. Node i then pushes this file id to j. If the dif-
ference between version numbers of this file locally
and in M ′ is 1, a per-block update (anupdate) is
done, otherwise a full file transfer (afile) is used.
Node i also selects one of the files in the stash
set of M ′ that is still receptive at node i. Node i
sends a pull message, containing this file’s id, to
node j, which then replies with either a file transfer
or update. For all remaining id’s in the stash set
of M ′ that are retained locally at node i, those files
with local version numbers that are greater or equal
are quietly moved into the stash state; the ones with
lower local version numbers are deleted.
To ensure that an inserted file ramps up to the sta-
ble number of stashers, initial replicas are associ-
ated with a TTL=time to live. Any replica created
with non-zero TTL is forced to stay stashed for the
next TTL periods, after which normal Folklore ac-
tions apply. TTL is initialized by the owner, as de-
scribed below. Every new replica created by a stash-
receptive contact inherits the TTL from its stashed
parent, less a quantity w = Si1
2
β
. Here, Si is parent
node’s stash size, thus w is the expected time (in pe-
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riods) to advertise the replica once. The owner ini-
tializes the TTL to w.log
(β
2
+1)
S∞ periods. S∞
is an estimate of the stable number of stashers, e.g.,
based on expected system size. The total number
of forced replicas grows by a factor of (β2 + 1) ev-
ery w periods, thus the logarithm’s base. It should
be evident that all TTLs reach 0 a while after file
insertion.
2.4 File Location, Update, and Recovery
The untrusted nature of hosts allows us to impose
the restriction that all such accesses are done by the
owner node of the file. This allows us to build in
relatively simple solutions that leverage off a heart-
beating strategy.
The heartbeating strategy requires each file f to
be associated with a heartbeat probability parame-
ter (f) ∈ [0, 1]. At the beginning of a protocol pe-
riod at node H , for each locally stashed file f , and
with probability (f), H sends its owner a heartbeat
message specifying the file’s 〈id, version〉. The ex-
pected number of heartbeat messages received at
a file’s owner, per protocol period, is thus hb =
(f) × N × 1−
γ
β
1+ γ
β
, where N is the number of non-
faulty nodes currently in the system. If the expected
range for N is known,  can be set so that the owner
receives a constant number of heartbeats per file per
period.  also trades between response time for a
lookup and the bandwidth used by heartbeats.
Due to heartbeats, the owner of a file f is not re-
quired to store the file anymore. Only knowledge
of the latest version number and symmetric key suf-
fices. When the owner wishes to locate a copy, it
simply waits to receive the next heartbeat for file f
with the latest version number. For recovery, if the
owner does not know the latest version number, it
(1) first waits a while to estimate the highest version
number in received heartbeats, and (2) then trans-
fers a replica from the next node sending a heartbeat
with that maximum version number.
The heartbeating mechanism can be used to
spread updates. An update can be spread immedi-
ately to a node that sent a heartbeat – if the ver-
sion number difference is 1, then only modified
blocks are transferred, otherwise the entire new file
is transferred. The previous section discussed up-
dates through stash-receptive and stash-stash con-
tacts.
Suppose the stable number of stashers for a file is
S∞, and the average number of heartbeats received
per protocol period is hb. Then, the number of up-
dated stashers Si after i rounds since the update start
satisfies (S∞ − Si) =
(S∞ − Si−1)[(1 − hbS∞ )(1 −
β.Si−1
2N )(1 − 1N )β.Si−1/2]
Analysis and experiments show that within the
square brackets, the last two terms (stash-stash
and stash-receptive contact) dominate the first term
(heartbeating).
3 Attack Analysis of Folklore
We discuss vulnerabilities of the Folklore system
and its behavior under various types of attacks.
Replica or Version Corruption: A malicious
stasher or a man in the middle that causes changes
to a replica, or its version, or its id will be detected
by a good node during signature verification. This
can also be used to raise an alarm about malicious
nodes.
Owner Node Takeover: If the owner node is taken
over, but the private key of the owner is not compro-
mised, the attacker can view heartbeats and files, but
will be unable to propagate updates. Thus, a Folk-
lore file cannot be corrupted by an owner takeover
attack.
Intentional File id Collisions: If a node detects an
id conflict, it will ask all conflicting file owners to
rename their files. If any of the owners refuse, they
are blacklisted at the detecting node.
Sybil Attack: This attack occurs when a large
number of nodes are (or appear to be) malicious in
the system. For instance, an extreme variety works
by breaching a gateway. Although such an attack
can cripple any system, Folklore allows a good node
to be able to detect such an attack if the number of
heartbeats received per period is too low.
4 Experimental Results
Folklore is implemented in C. We present exper-
imental results from a simulated Folklore system
running on a 3GHz PIV, 1GB RAM, Linux PC. The
system has 1000 nodes, with protocol period T = 5
minutes, and α = 0.05, γ = 0.4. A node contacts 5
peers each protocol period (thus β = 10).
Chaotic Replication: At time t = 10000 s, 1000
files are simultaneously inserted into the system,
each from a unique owning node. Figure 2 shows
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Figure 2: Replica propagation. 1000 files are inserted into
the network.
Figure 3: Effect of Parameter Attack, Over-replication and
Replica Destruction.
how the number of replicas (for file 0) varies over
time; similar trends were observed for the other
files. The stable expected number of replicas is 120.
The chaotic behavior of the protocol around this sta-
ble value is evident from Figure 2.
Parameter Attack: Figures 3(a)-3(c) show the
effect of a large collection of malicious nodes us-
ing bad values for protocol parameters. Figure 3(a)
shows the effect of a random parameter attack - a
fraction of nodes choose random values for α, γ ∈
[0, 1]. With 50% of the nodes malicious, the num-
ber of replicas of each file increases only two-fold.
Figure 3(b) shows the effect of an over-replicating
attack. Over-replicating nodes reduce the protocol
period to 30 s and lock the replica in stash state, i.e.,
never changes to averse. With 25% of malicious
nodes, the number of replicas only increases by a
factor of 3. Figure 3(c) shows a deletion attack.
Even when 75% nodes delete all files they purport
to stash, the number of replicas stays non-zero.
Churn Attack: In a network of 526 nodes and
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Figure 4: Effect of Churn Attack.
526 files, churn was introduced at time t = 18557.
Figure 4 shows the typical effect for a file – churn
causes the number of replicas to halve, but not dis-
appear.
5 Conclusion
It is possible to build distributed file systems that
use a single core protocol to provide both scale and
notions of security. The Folklore distributed file
system is built around scalable endemic replication,
whose chaotic yet self-stabilizing behavior provides
replica untraceability. Experiments show resilience
to massive attacks. We leave details of the Folklore
membership protocol, and PC cluster-based exper-
iments to a later article. We are also augmenting
Folklore to withstand other types of attacks.
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